Social Security Advisory Committee 19th Report - August 2005 – July 2006
Sanctions in the benefit system: Evidence review of JSA, IS and IB sanctions
Annex E of the Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) 19th Report outlines the current sanctioning regimes for Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), income support (IS) and incapacity benefit (IB) and discusses the effect of sanctions in persuading people back into work.
In doing this the review considers both Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and non-DWP research as well as evidecne from international studies.
Findings
There is some evidence from international studies that the threat of sanctions had some effect in moving people off benefits and into work but evidence from DWP studies "suggests that claimants themselves believe that sanctions have only a weak influence on their own behaviour, especially in terms of jobsearch". In fact 46 percent of those sanctioned "stated that the threat of a sanction would make no difference to whether they looked for work".
The sanctioning process
With regard to JSA there are a number of specific issues associated with the process:
• 18% of claimants do not understand the sanctioning rules.
• The sanctioning process is not clearly explained.
• There is a lack of uniformity in the application of sanctions.
• There is a lack of support for those who have been sanctioned.
Incapacity benefit sanctions
There is currently very little evidence on IB sanctions under Pathways to Work. There are however numerous opportunities for waivers and deferrals not available to JSA claimants - for example cliamants with a stated mental health condition or learning disability must be visited before a sanction is imposed.
Up until April 2005 there had been a maximum of 182 sanctions. Research specifically on IB sanctions is planned for 2006/07.
Under Welfare Reform the majority of IB clients will enter into the Pathways system. It was noted that "providing the same level of tailored support is likely to require more resource than has currently been promised" and that "extending conditionality on disabled people would bring substantial financial and political risks as well as threatening real harm to disabled people".
Policy recommendations
Communications need to be improved at all stages of the sanction process (e.g. the initial discussion of the responsibilities of benefit receipt, when a sanction is being considered, when it is imposed and after it ends). The written material needs to be made clearer and a greater use of face-to-face or telephone interaction should be used. This is especially the case for claimants with English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) or Basic Skills needs.
All sanctioned claimants should be told about the availability of hardship payments and offered support in applying for them when appropriate. it is essential that claimants have a good understanding of the sanction regime and their own responsibilities within it.
Tied into improved communications, is the need to consider how to engage effectively with those who are at risk of a sanction and those who have been sanctioned. All sanctioned claimants should be told about the availability of hardship payments and offered support in applying for them when appropriate. The resource implications of reworking the communications and increasing face-to-face contact may be significant, but it is essential that claimants have a good understanding of the sanction regime and their own responsibilities within it.
Leaving voluntarily - The evidence suggests that the retrospective sanctioning for leaving employment voluntarily ( LV) is not well understood and penalises people who have genuine reasons for leaving a job. For those people who do understand the sanction associated with LV, it may actually act as a disincentive to try out a job. It is also difficult to see how LV has a deterrent effect on people who are yet to claim benefits. There are two options for changing LV which would help overcome the lack of specific understanding of the sanction amongst potential claimants. They would also reduce the inefficiency in the current system and help support a flexible labour market. These options are:
complete removal of the LV sanction
An easement whereby sanctions would not be imposed the first time claimants left a job voluntarily. Subsequent cases could then be considered as possibly deserving of sanction – but by this stage the claimant should have been informed of the LV sanction.
Fixed fines - There are two options for fixed fines: the first as a replacement for the current sanctions regimes and the second as an addition to the current regimes (for example, for failing to keep a Jobcentre Plus appointment). Referral for the fines would be more ‘automatic’ than now, although there would still need to be a decision making and appeals procedure. Depending on the level at which the fines were fixed, they would be likely to reduce the financial impact on claimants (if they replaced the current regime) and would reduce the time between ‘offence’ and financial penalty. The fines would need to be set at a level that produced a deterrent effect but did not cause undue hardship. It would be important to ensure that changing the regime to include fixed fines did not add to the complexity of the benefit system.
There needs to be closer monitoring of the sanction administration on a regular basis. Jobcentre Plus managers should be monitored centrally on key indicators associated with sanctions. This action would not entail setting a national target rate for referrals and sanctions but instead would involve developing an indicator that could be used to monitor rates and deal with anomalies in the sanction regime. It should minimise any inequity in the regime caused by the markedly different sanctioning rates across districts.
Lone parents - Steps should be taken to ensure that under a more intensive work focused interview (WFI) regime, lone parents do not face the possibility of multiple sanctions leading to the loss of benefit within a short period of time.
Note: for pdf files you will need to download
adobe acrobat reader. To convert the pdf to alternative formats or for more information on accessibility go to access adobe.
skip navigation 
Social Security Advisory Committee 19th Report - August 2005 – July 2006 
